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Abstract 
In this paper, I intend to explain what we mean by globalized party-based democracy in an African 
context.1 The paper treats globalized party-based democracy as an extension of African colonial and 
imperial legacy and probes questions on the influence of today’s global party-based democracy 
networks on African political parties. Specifically, I compare the accession of the major political 
parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi to global party-based democracy networks, and their influence 
on their ideologies and policy orientations in an era of neo-liberal globalisation.  
 
If some aspects of African party-based democracy have globalized, the next question is what aspects 
have not (been) globalized. Paradoxically, despite a myriad of global influences, party-based 
democracies in Africa have retained much of their nascent quasi-polyarchy traits characterised by 
ethnic, religious and regional divisions, political patronage and weak internal party democracy.  This 
prospect negates the idea that African political parties, indeed African political institutions, are under 
threat of being “universalised” as consequence of the ascendancy of globalized party-based 
democracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
African political parties emerged in the non-democratic setting of colonial rule. A reformed 
post-Second World War colonial state sought to include Africans in the administration of 
their affairs. It had also created a pool of educated political elite experienced in operating 
Western style political institutions. Africans were allowed, under strict political surveillance, 
to establish political parties in order to oversee the machinery of government when their 
countries attained independence.  
 
In the urge to leave behind political institutions similar to those of the west, the departing 
colonial governments decided to export to Africa their peculiar version of parliamentary 
government, with several competing political parties and recognised opposition. In practice, 
due to the speed with which this political developme nt occurred, numerous ethnically-based 
parties emerged. Indeed they were encouraged by the colonial rule, because ethnic groups 
offered the most organised groups that were instantly available for political party formation. 2 
However, ethnic divisions were minimised by the flare of synthetic nationalism, that although 
pitched opposing political parties against each other, remained focused on attaining the 
cherished goal of independence.  
 
Political parties were established, assumed the struc tures and functions of Western-styled 
political parties and in the majority of countries, managed to see their countries through 
independence and self-rule. In some countries, it took the emergent African political elite less 
than a decade from establishing political parties to contesting elections and assuming the role 
of governing their countries. 3 
 
By-and-large, the political elite consumed the goal of national unity, which gave birth to their 
political ambitions. After independence, the elite fell back to sub-nationalist and ethnic 
politics within less than a decade of the attainment of independence and the waning of the 
short-lived excitement for decolonised nationalism. 4  
 
Fuelled by the Cold War and internal divisions, party-based democracy was the first victim of 
the political excesses of the ruling elite. In some countries, it fomented the rise of sub-
nationalism and with it civil wars, liberation movements and political instability. 5 Regression 
to military rule, military socialism and different forms of authoritarian regimes was also a 
great obstacle to party-based democracy. In most cases, the authoritarian regimes banned all 
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political parties , curbed trade union and civic associations’ activities and created 
constitutional one-party states.  
 
The colonialists viewed political parties as hostile, despite the fact that some political parties 
had joined alliances with colonial rule, while the constituent assemblies were considered an 
extension of colonial rule. 6 To that extent, the constituent assemblies had restricted powers, 
often over-ruled by the Governor General and were allowed to debate only those issues that 
would pose no security threat to the colonial state. For instance, in most British colonies, 
Africans represented only a fraction of the members of the constituent assemblies, which 
were also members of the Empire Parliamentary Association. 7  
 
To be sure, African party-based democracy was born in the embryo of the colonial state 
coloured with a distinct hybrid of African political culture and western political thought. This 
development meant that the emergent political parties on the one hand championed 
independence and were considered hostile to colonial rule , and on the other adopted the 
dominant Western party-based democracy and its ideological modicum of the time.  
 
There are at least two implications of the colonial origins of African party-based democracy: 
1) the colonial era has sown the seeds of globalized party-based democracy, even before the 
emergence of the current wave of globalisation. It is therefore relevant to the contention that 
developing countries’ globalized political institutions have their antecedence in the colonial 
and imperial expansions; and 2) the current consequences of neo-liberal globalisation on 
national political institutions, in particular political parties , do not represent a rupture in 
political party development. It combines the tw in processes of continuity and change 
informed by the new global context of political development. 
 
Until the early 1990s, most African political parties subscribed to one of two dominant global 
ideological trends: Socialism/communism or vaguely defined “liberal democratic” forms of 
government. Admittedly, there were only a few African party-based democracies, as two-
thirds of the continent was for a time under  the rule of authoritarian one-party states, military 
socialism or military dictatorships.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, however, party-based democracy acquired prominence at the 
global level, where multi-partyism became synonymous with democracy. In the case of 
 5 
Africa, the resurgence of multi-party democracy during the 1990s was a result of the triumph 
of the neo-liberal paradigm over various forms of authoritarianism. During this period, 
“institutionalism” became the dominant force informing economic and political liberalisation. 
International finance institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) preaching the primacy of “institutionalism”: The market and New 
Policy Management (NPM), in the case of economic governance, and the rule of law and 
good governance in case of political institutions. 8 
 
If economic globalisation has become synonymous with economic liberalisation and free 
trade and market principles, then political liberalisation has become synonymous with 
democratisation, often projected as the prevalence of multi-party democracy, hence party-
based democracy. Globalized party-based democracy in Africa, therefore, cannot be isolated 
from these global developments and influences that have shaped its structure and policy 
orientations. 
 
In particular, political liberalisation has invoked a series of political reform programmes, 
which in most countries included constitutional reforms to allow the formation of political 
parties and civic associations. This development has opened up the political space for 
electoral competition and the reform of statutory, penal and administrative structures that had 
once impeded any political activities outside the confines of the ruling political party, thus  
lifting the ban or legalizing the formation of political parties. These political, legal and 
administrative reforms extended civil liberties previously curbed under authoritarian one-
party regimes, thus allowing the emergence of autonomous civil society and non-
governmental organisations.  
 
In this respect, we could attribute three major developments in African party-based 
democracy to neo-liberal globalisation:  
 
1) the adoption or reconciliation of major party policy orientations with the neo-liberal 
globalisation paradigm;  
2) the emergence of new political parties and civil society movements created by new 
political activists not part of or emerging out of the old political establishment; and 
3) the integration of African political parties into global party-based democracy 
networks.  
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These three developments guide the discussion on whether African parties have been able to 
acquire both the form and content of a globalized party-based democracy. 
 
Instead of asking how globalisation has contributed to the emergence of globalized party-
based democracy, this paper explores how political parties in three African countries - Ghana, 
Kenya and Malawi – have reacted to neo-liberal globalisation. In particular, how they 
translated their party manifestos into policy orientations informed by or subservient to the 
neo-liberal global paradigm.  
 
This approach is important for a number of reasons:  
 
i) It helps us study concrete political party principles, policies and practice vis-à-vis 
globalisation, instead of just speculating about how globalisation might or might 
not affect their ideological orientation and structures.  
ii) It underscores variation in political party responses in lieu of the economic and 
political factors that informed their reaction to globalized party-based democracy. 
Analysing African globalized party-based democracy from this perspective offers 
safeguards against crude generalisation.  
iii)  It also helps us pose the question as to what aspects of African party-based 
democracy have not (been) globalized. 
 
These aspects of globalized party-based democracy in Africa are explored below with 
specific reference to post-1990s transition to multi-party democracy using the cases of Ghana, 
Kenya and Malawi for illustration. 
 
WHAT IS GLOBALIZED ABOUT AFRICA PARTY-BASED DEMOCRACIES?  
The question, what globalized party-based democracy means is yet to be answered in a 
systematic manner. This section does not pretend to answer this complex question in its 
entirety. It seeks to identify and explain three parameters that are characteristic of an 
emergent globalized party-based democracy in Africa. These are as follows:  
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a) An emergent globally informed quasi-polyarchy where political parties subscribe to 
broadly defined party-based democratic principles; 
b) Except for a few, political party policies and programmes are largely influenced by 
the economic and social policy age nda also part of the dominant neo-liberal global 
paradigm; and  
c) African political parties have integrated into global party-democracy networks that in 
turn influenced and contributed to their partnership in joint activities and exchange of 
experiences. 
 
These three parameters are elaborated in turn; 
An emergent globally-informed quasi-polyarchy9 
Polyarchy refers to regimes that have been substantially popularised and liberalised, are 
highly inclusive and open extensively to public contestation. 10 A near-polyarchy can be 
relatively inclusive but with greater restrictions on public contestation than full polyarchy, or 
it might provide opportunities for public contestation comparable to those of a full polyarchy 
but somewhat less inclusive.11 In this sense, most democratic regimes that allow to some 
degree for the challenge of power by the public are, in fact, quasi-polyarchy denotes 
democracies that fell short of the ideals of democracy.  
 
The reference to quasi-polyarchy in the African context is significant not only because it 
recognises that there are various degrees of adherence to the democratic ideals accepted as 
characteristics of global party-based democracy, but also because it highlights two main 
possibilities. First, that polyarchy is a welcome development in countries where it signifies a 
move away from hegemonic regimes. Second, that in countries without recent experience 
with competitive politics, the transformation of hegemonic regimes into polyarchy is likely to 
remain a slow process, measured in generations.12  
 
The relevance of this to Africa and developing countries in general is that their democracies 
are most likely to exhibit characteristics unique to their political culture. It alerts us to the 
grim possibility that securing any success by reproducing and exporting blueprints of western 
democracies is unrealistic and hardly practicable.  
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Without exception and both in terms of policy orientations and to large extent in practice, 
African political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi have subscribed to the overall ethos of 
polyarchy. These characteristics inform their political party programmes, policies and 
manifestos. These are ; “freedom to form and join organisations; freedom of expression; right 
to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political leaders to compete for support; right of 
political leaders to compete for votes; alternative sources of information; free and fair 
elections; and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference.”13  
 
However, because the political parties and the governments they form are far from fulfilling 
all the requirements of polyarchy, they lean towards quasi-polyarchy. Generally, they have 
accepted to operate under the rules-game laid down and conditionalities imposed by the 
global governance.  
 
African opposition political parties, noting that governments do not often abide by the 
democratic rule, demand full compliance with the ethos of polyarchy. Unfortunately, once in 
government, opposition parties, also in common with most democracies in the world, revert 
to quasi-polyarchical and at times non-democratic tendencies. While is very easy for 
opposition political parties to preach bold and rhetorical questions, once in power, they find 
themselves constrained by a completely different policy environment –  one where they have 
to respond to increasing demands with the meagre resources of underdeveloped economies.  
 
African political parties adhere to quasi-polyarchy not only due to external pressures exerted 
by global governance, democracy and human rights activists, but also for their own sake. 
Polyarchy is a safeguard against dictatorship  and the return to authoritarian rule. Its ethos 
opens up the political space for competitive politics , which in turn offer the possibility of 
competing in elections and even governing should they become the majority party in 
parliament. Little wonder that globalized party-based democracy in Africa is largely quasi-
polyarchy, which is the dominant feature of the majority of democracies worldwide.  
Globally influenced political party programmes  
African political parties, wit h the exception of a few socialist or Marxist oriented parties, 
have embraced the major tenets of “liberal democracy” reflected in their political party 
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programmes, manifestos, charters and their new or reformed constitutions. The principles of 
free contestation and participation in the political process meant that the need for 
“liberalizing” the political space was:  
 
(a) a factor of popular and civil society agitation against decades of dictatorship; 
(b)   a requirement demanded by political parties banned for decades from participating in 
politics or newly formed political parties offer ing themselves as alternatives to the single 
ruling political party; and  
(c) global governance, democracy and human rights activism, bilateral or multi-lateral donor 
conditionality and global economic governance under the influence and insistence of 
IMF and World Bank on instilling the ethos of good or better governance and political 
liberalisation on a global scale.  
 
These developments have shaped the political programmes and policies of the major political 
parties across Africa. Below I explain how neo-liberal global economic and social policy 
orientations have influenced the post 1990s reforms and the political parties’ response.  
 
Table (1) shows the composition of political parties in the parliament of Ghana since the 
commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1993.14 The distribution of votes illustrate s the 
presence of strong competition between Rawling’s National Democratic Congress (NDC) and 
the New Patriotic Party (NPP) by which Ghana is evidently a two-party state .  
 
Since the 1993 elections, parliamentary discussions and political elite debate has been over 
how their political parties  could respond more adequately to the economic policy reforms 
subscribed by the global finance institutions (World Bank and IMF). There were no 
dissenting voices within the ranks of the two dominant political parties regarding abandoning 
the economic policy reforms or suggesting alternative policies to those proposed by the 
international finance institutions.15 In this regard, NDC was the champion of Ghana’s policy 
reforms, particularly, the special place that it earned in the global finance institutions for 
rigorously implementing the economic reform policy. Ghana was successful in managing the 
Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP) started in 1983—stabilising the economy through 
IMF/World Bank economic liberalis ation policies. 16 
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However, with the economic slow down early last decade, NPP, which formed the backbone 
of the opposition, gained popular support, accusing the NDC of corruption and inability to 
implement the economic reform agenda diligently. NPP is pursuing an economic policy 
traditionally associated with the NDC and, perhaps, succeeding where NDC failed.  
 
Table 1: Political parties represented in parliaments, Ghana (1993-) 
1993 1997 2001 2004 Political party 
Seats % Seat % Seats % Seats % 
National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) 
189 94.5 133 66.5 92 45.0 94 40.86 
New Patriotic Party  (NPP) -  61 30.5 100 50.0 128 55.65 
Grand Coalition         
* National Convention Party 
(NCP) 
8   4.0 -    -  -  
Peoples National Convention 
(PNC)  
-  1 0.5 3 1.5 4 1.73 
Convention Peoples Party 
(CPP) 
- - - - 1 0.5 3 1.30 
Every Ghanaian Living 
Everywhere (EGLE) 
1 0.5 -  -  -  
*PCP -  5 2.5 -  -  
Independent 2 1.0 -  4 2.0 1 0.43 
Total 200 100.0 200 100.0 200 100.0 230 99.97 
Source: National Electoral Commission (NEC) of Ghana, “Election Results,” published in 1993, 
1997, 2001 and 2004, respectively, Accra, Ghana.  
 
Because there is no radically alternative political party policy that could pose serious 
challenge  to the general direction of Ghana’s economic policy reform, human rights and the 
rule of law became the key arena of polic y differences and political contestation. In respect to 
the global social issues involved, the NDC stresses the primacy of food, shelter, clothing, 
education and stability as the cornerstone of its human rights policy in its Manifesto, owing to 
its socialist ideological orientation.18  
 
While NPP Manifesto places emphasis on the enjoyment of human rights to their full and 
respect for the rule of law, NDC places emphasis on social justice. The war of visions 
between “fundamental human rights” and the “social justice”, common to the global debate 
between liberals and social democrats , was important for NPP. The abysmal human rights 
record of NDC’s and its association with Rawling's Military Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) government (1981-1992) justifies the NPP counter-critique . 
 
Unlike Ghana, which has undergone two unrestricted multi-party elections where NPP ousted 
the incumbent political party (NDC) from power by NPP, Kenya has undergone only one 
unrestricted multi-party election since independence - in December 1963. The electoral 
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victory of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in the 2002 elections, after a bitter 
struggle by national and global democracy and human rights activists, ended 40 years of 
Kenya African National Union’s (KANU) one party rule. Table (2) shows the results of the 
three multi-party elections during the post-political reform period. The elections of 1992 and 
1997 were fraudulent, and that of 2002 was relatively free and fair. 
 
Table 2: Political Parties Represented in Bunge, Kenya (1992-) 
1992 1997 2002  Political party 
Seats % Seats % Seats % 
1. Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) 
100 
(112) 
56.00 107 
(113) 
50.09 64 (68) 30.63 
2. National Rainbow coalition 
(NARC) 
- - - - 125 
(132) 
59.45 
3. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)  - - - - **  
4. Democratic Party (DP) (39+) 23 11.50 39(41) 18.46 ** ** 
5. Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K)  
31 15.50 17(18) 8.11 ** ** 
6. National Party of Kenya (NPK)  - - - - ** ** 
7. Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy-People (FORD P) 
- - 3 1.35 14(15) 6.75 
8. National Development Party 
(NDP) 
  21(22) 9.90   
9. Sisi Kwa Sisi (SKS)     2 0.90 
10. Safina (SAFINA)   5(6) 2.70 2 0.90 
11. Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy-Asili (Ford-A)  
31 15.50 1 0.45 2 0.90 
12. Social Democratic Party (SDP) - - 15 (16) 7.20 - - 
13. Kenya Social Congress (KSC) 1 0.50 1 0.45 - - 
14. Kenya National Congress (KNC) 1 0.50 - - - - 
15. Party of Independent Candidates 
of Kenya (PICK) 
1 0.50 - -- - - 
16. Shirikisho Party of Kenya 
(Shirikisho)  
- - 1 0.45 1 0.45 
             Total  180 
(200) 
100.00 210 
(222)* 
99.97 210 
(222)* 
99.93 
* 210 elected; 12 appointed, totalling 222 seats. 
** Included in NARC parliamentary group 
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Source: Election Commission of Kenya (ECK), Parliamentary Election Result Reports for 1992, 1997 and 
2002, Nairobi. 
 
However, NARC’s election pledge was centred on pursuing different and sound economic 
policies from those of KANU, reviving the economy and implementing the IMF and World 
Bank policies, in effect, subscribing more fully to the economic agenda of the international 
financial institutions. 21 Although NARC, a coalition of 14 large and small political parties 
with different ideological and policy orientations, continued the economic policy reforms 
initiated during the closing years of KANU supremacy, the World Bank and IMF supported 
economic liberalisation reforms including the removal of import licensing, price and foreign 
exchange controls.  
 
In retrospect, the IMF and the World Bank suspension of aid to Kenya in early 2001 (due to 
the government's failure to implement the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Programme, curb 
corruption and privatise key inefficient economic sectors), dealt KANU electoral hope a 
decisive blow. It created a sense of paralysis in the implementation of Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility Programme and Economic and Public Sector Reform. In the same year, 
Kenya experienced a serious economic recession. Kenya Gross Domestic Product actually 
shrunk to 0.3 per cent, almost reminiscent of the negative growth rates of the mid 1990s. 22 
 
The continuing presence of high profile politicians from the era of President Arap Moi, 
including President Mwai Kibabi and several NARC dignitaries made little difference in 
terms of political culture (corruption) or acceptance to reduce the powers of the President vis-
à-vis parliament in the new constitution. A vivid example is that even university professors 
such as Peter Anyang Nyong’o began to realise the difficulties of trying bring a marriage 
between the political lure and abysmal economic dividend of neo-liberal globalisa tion.  
 
Mainstream political parties’ malice contributed to the emergence of more radical leftist 
parties in Kenya than probably anywhere else in the continent, as people began to realise that 
there is little substance beneath the facade of electoral promises. Among the most prominent 
of Kenya’s 16 leftist political parties are the following: Anti-capitalist Convergence of Kenya 
(ACCK), Poor Man’s Liberation Front (PMLF) and Party of the Proletariat and Peasants. The 
two green parties (Green African Party and Mazingira Green Party) also have leftist leanings. 
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Three centre left parties are represented in NARC—the Labour Party of Kenya (LPK), Kenya 
National Democratic Alliance and Kenya Socialist Party (KSP).  
 
Whereas global governance and international financial institutions could influence the 
programmes of large political parties or political parties that are poised to win elections and 
govern, smaller political parties can afford to be defiant and even radical. In the case of 
Kenya, the smaller political parties’ rhetoric seems to pay more dividend than realism. 
Radical rhetoric has therefore become the only discourse that distinguishes them from the 
governing political parties.  
 
In common with Kenya and Ghana, Malawi’s transition to multi-party democracy came about 
as a result of popular struggles supported by the proactive solidarity of the global democracy 
networks and activists. President Kamuzu Banda, t he chair of Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 
that governed the a one-party state for 30 years, accepted the 1993 referendum that rejected 
the continuation of single party rule and opted for multi-party democracy. 23 The first multi-
party election took place in 1994 and MCP, the incumbent party, lost (see table 3). 
 
Table 3: Political Parties Represented in Malawi National Assembly (1994-) 
1994 1999 2004 Political party 
seats % Seats % Seats % 
United Democratic Front (UDF) 84 47.45 93  48.34 49 25.40 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 55 31.10 66  34.36 56 29.00 
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) 36 20.33 29  15.10 6 3.10 
Congress for National Unity (CONU) - - - - 1 0.50 
People Transformation Party (PETRA) - - - - 1 0.50 
Peoples Progressive Movement (PPM) - - - - 6 3.10 
Movement for Genuine Democracy 
(MGODE) 
- - - - 3 1.60 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) - - - - 8 4.10 
Republican Party (RP) - - - - 15 7.80 
Undecided 2 1.12 - - 6 3.10 
Independents - - 4  2.08 39 20.20 
Total 177 100.00 192 99.88 193 98.40 
Source: Malawi Election Committee (MEC), “Parliamentary Election Result Reports,” 1994, 
1999 and 2004,  
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The political programmes and manifestos of Malawi major political parties and coalitions, 
which formed the three governments since the first multi-party elections, responded to 
national issues informed by the dominant neo-liberal paradigm. The manifestos of Malawi’s 
political parties are almost identical to those pronounced by governing and opposition 
political parties in Ghana and Kenya. Wilfred Sumani (2004) succinctly described the 
similarity of Malawi political party programmes. He purports that, the convergence of visions 
would make policy-making processes easier and more sustainable, than in a situation where 
different parties have fundamental differences such as being for or against homosexual 
marriages, abortion, capital punishment, socialism’s regimental economic system or 
capitalism’s laissez-faire worldview.25  
 
In fact, all the issues Sumani mentions are identical to those currently occupying large space 
in the political debate in various part of the world and in particular the USA and Europe. 
These issues offer an added emphasis on the globalized nature of party-based democracies’ 
political programmes and policy orientations. 
 
For example, political party manifestos are almost identical dealing with issues such free 
trade, privatisation, public sector reforms, democracy and the rule of law, good governance 
(often dubbed as anti-corruption strategies), economic policy reforms, poverty reduction 
strategies, sustainable development, gender auditing among others.26. However, aware of the 
global context within which they operate, post-political reform governments were able to 
implement national socio-economic policies carefully designed to gauge public support and 
improve their electability. 27 Equally, they have mostly maintained a balancing act and adopt a 
minimalist approach to neo-liberal economic policy reforms and meet their obligations to 
donors and international finance institutions.  
 
What is important here is not that political parties act on their electoral pledges and 
manifestos. African political parties are not different from political parties in  mos t parts of the 
world: they do not fully implement all the electoral pledges they make in their election 
manifestos. However, w hat is important is that election pledges and party manifestos inform 
the conduct of government. It is therefore safe to argue that the political parties operated 
under conditions of abject poverty, high hopes and very limited resources, which often stifle 
their good intentions to act on their promises. 
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Integration of African political parties into global parliamentary and party-based 
democracy networks  
This section explains the integration of the political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi into 
global-party democracy networks. Ideologically like-minded global party networks not only 
maintain solidarity, but also strategize and lend democracy assistance to foster the ethos of 
global party-to-party cooperation and networks. Whether these global party-based democracy 
networks affect the conduct of African democracies is a complex question that this paper will 
not be able to answer in totality. However, it is possible to draw some ideas about the 
potential consequences of global party-based democracy networ ks activities for future 
development of African party-based democracy development.  
 
In the following sub-section, I divide global democracy networks into two types of networks: 
parliamentary and party-to-party networks. Both are member-paying networks different from 
the international democracy assistance institutions that are generally fraternal.29  Global 
party-to-party networks espouse direct relationships with their partner institutions and are 
open only to those political parties that share similar ideological orientation. However, recent 
trends show that international democracy assistance institutions encourage all-party 
programmes in order to foster cooperation and mute hostile rivalry among political parties 
and politicians .  
Global parliamentary democracy networks: 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) is by far the oldest global parliamentary lobby network 
in the World.30 Established in 1889, during the highest of colonial expansion, as the 
International Organisation of Parliaments of Sovereign States, today 140 parliaments are 
members of IPU. It is made-up of six geoplotical groups (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Arab, Eurasia, 
Latin America and 12-Plus Group i.e. Western and Eastern European countries). Its office at 
the United Nations is also active in providing parliamentary hearings and organizes 
international events. 
 
Although some members of IPU do not adhere to liberal democracy (China, Cuba and 
Cambodia) , in 1997, it adopted the Universal Declaration on Democracy.31 The  activities it 
organizes in support of the democratic process once it is unleashed, without being actively 
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engaged in fomenting agitations for democracy, reflect its adherence to the Universal 
declaration of democracy.  
 
The IPU Africa group consists of 39 members, with the absence of Chad, Eritrea, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Somalia and Swaziland. The parliaments of Kenya and Ghana are 
active members of IPU, currently represented by parliamentarians from the governing 
political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Ghana.  
 
The IPU organises Pan-African, and sub-regional symposia and on subjects such as  
representative democracy, international peace and security, sustainable development, human 
rights, education, science and culture and women in parliament. The stated objective of these 
is to aid democracy and improve the quality of governance as well as enhance worldwide 
parliamentary dialogue and peace through the establishment of representative democracy.  
 
Of particular relevance to Ghana, Kenya and Malawi is the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association (CPA),32 which is by far, the second oldest global democracy network. 
Established in 1911 as the Empire Parliamentary Association, the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association’s (CPA) members consist of 170 national, state, provincial and 
territorial parliaments, with about 15,000 Parliamentarians.  
 
The CPA mission is to advance parliamentary democracy, enhance knowledge and 
understanding of democratic governance, and build an informed parliamentary community 
able to deepen the Commonwealth democratic commitment and further cooperation among 
its parliaments and legislatures.  
 
There is a distinct African group within the Commonwealth called Pan-African 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Group which cooperates with the Pan-African Parliament.33 
The governing political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi are members. Generally, the 
new global context of development influences the activities of global parliamentary networks. 
Although parliamentary networks are mainly interested in improving the capabilities of 
parliamentarians and the capacity of parliaments, their activities also influence political 
parties. This is not only because parliamentarians represent political parties and the 
electorates who voted for them, but also because the strong presence of parties constituting 
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the governing majority has strong bearing on government policy and programmes as well as 
adherence to democratic principles.34  
 
By their historical antecedence and current functions, global parliamentary networks 
represent an element of continuity from colonialism and imperialism into the current 
developments of the globaliz ing world in which they operate. Therefore , they have to cope 
with this dual heritage and the new opportunities it offers as part of the global governance 
regime.  
Global party-to-party partnerships and networks 
The accession of African political parties to global-party-to-party networks is a new 
phenomenon dating back less than two decades.  It is a product of the end of the Cold War 
and the ideological schism between East and West, post 1990s transition to democracy and 
the opening up of the political space for proactive transnational political, economic and social 
networks. The  subsequent evolution and maturation of these networks has signalled the end 
of the state monopoly of inter-state relations and the emergence of non-state actors such as 
civil society and non-governmental organizations and political party networks.  So in this 
subsection, we trace the integration of the major Ghanaian, Kenyan and Malawian political 
parties in these networks and their policy influences. 
 
African Christian Democrats Union (ACDU) is part of the International Christian Democrats 
Union (ICDU) - an association that consists of Conservative, Christian Democrats or what 
they call like-minded political parties of the centre and centre -right. ACDU activities are 
attended by parliamentarians representing their political parties or the youth troikas of the 
member parties,  for example, Ghana is represented by the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) 
Youth Wing (NPPY) and Ghana Liberal Students Association (GHALSA), Malaw i by 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP), United Democratic Front Youth (UDFY) and Kenya 
Democratic Party (DP). The youth element is particularly significant for recruitment, 
internalizing democratic values and preparing the next generation of democrats.  
 
In August 1997, eleven African liberal youth organisations founded the Dakar-based 
Democrat Union of Africa/African Dialogue Group (DUA/ADG) as part of the International 
Democrats Union (IDU). IDU member parties organized in regional networks most of which 
came to existence as new democracies established during the 1990s. 35 DUA/ADG provides a 
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forum for parties with similar convictions to come to meet and exchange views and 
experiences on matters of policy and organisation, so that they can learn from each other, act 
together and establish contacts. More importantly, the agree on common positions to 
influence the direction of global policies once they are in power and speak with one voice to 
promote democracy and centre-right policies around the globe.  
 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) of Ghana; Democratic Party (DP) of Kenya; and Congress Party 
(MCP), of Malawi are members of IDU. While NPP and MPC are the main opposition parties 
in Ghana and Malawi, respectively, the Democratic Party of Kenya is a member of the 
governing National Rainbow Coalition. This also shows that parties that share similar 
convictions have the opportunity to meet and exchange ideas regardless of whether or not 
they are in government. 
 
Socialist International is a worldwide organisation of social democratic, socialist and labour 
parties. Currently, it brings together 162 political parties and organisations from all 
continents. Twenty-three African political parties are Socialist International members (19 full 
members and 4 observers). The opposition, National Democratic Congress (NDC), is the only 
Ghanaian political party represented in Socialist International. Although Kenya has more 
leftist political parties than any other African country, none of its socialist or leftist parties are 
members of  Socialist International.   
 
Apparently, the association of Socialist International with the socialist political parties of the 
Cold War era still haunts many socialist-oriented African political parties fearful of being 
associated with the military socialism of the past. Nevertheless, once in power, they subscribe 
to the neo-liberal agenda and therefore exhibit little if any policy differences from their 
political opponents.36 
 
The Green Party Federation of Africa is member of the Global Green Federation, which 
consists of 800 green parties worldwide. There are 15 African Green Party members 
including the Mazingira Green Party of Kenya. The general principles that bring Greens 
together include economical wisdom, social justice, participatory democracy, sustainability 
and respect for diversity and non-violence. 37 
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Although the African Greens are yet to exert significant influence on African polity, they 
attract considerable solidarity with the global green movement and its ecological campaigns 
against oil, mineral and industrial pollution, rainforest logging and the protection of 
biodiversity. 38 However, support in African environmental struggles is yet to translate into 
parliamentary seats in any of the three sample countries.  
 
Liberal International (LI) is an association of parties, groups, cooperating organisations and 
individuals that support and accept the liberal principles aimed at fostering the growth of a 
democratic society based on personal liberty, personal responsibility and social justice. LI 
provides financial and human resources for cooperation and interchange of information 
between member organisations and men and women of all countries who accept these 
principles.  
 
United Democratic Front (UDF) of Malawi is a member of Liberal International, as well as a 
member of the London-based African Liberal Network (ALN) established in 2003 by 17 
African liberal political parties.  It is paradoxical that although the policies adopted by most 
African governing political parties have a neo-liberal orientation, they do not declare 
themselves liberal, out of fear of their opponents’ critique. But UDF openly declares its 
adoption of liberal international principles, without which Liberal International will not 
accept its membership of this globalized party-based democracy network. 39 
 
Arguably, Africa’s political party integration in global parliamentary and party-to-party 
networks illustrate that a third generation African party-based democracies (the first being the 
colonial and the second being a mix of one -party systems and restricted democracies of the 
1990s) have emerged. This generation is more confident and open to global party-to-party 
networks influences and the globalized democratic values they propagate.  
 
At least two scenarios are possible: 1) global parliamentary associations and political party 
networks, initiated by mature democracies influence party-based democracy in Africa by 
persuasion, training and exchange of strategy and policy. The ultimate outcome of these 
networks and interactions is creating a global space for better dispensation of democratic 
values. A counter argument is that 2) the continuing presence of powerful global democratic 
trends and values would deprive Africans the opportunity to devise paths to democracy 
independent of global influences.  
 20 
 
The major contribution of global democracy networks, in my view, is the incarnation of a 
gentler political modernization agenda under the guise of modernisation revisionism and a 
dominant neo-liberal paradigm.40 Another outcome of externally-driven globalized party-
based democracy is the widening of the gulf between elite -dominated political institutions 
such as political parties and parliaments on the one side, and on the other the masses of the 
illiterate African citizens who would feel increasingly alienated by the conduct of the political 
elite. The ultimate result of such scenario is political apathy and withdrawal.  
 
WHAT HAS NOT GLOBALIZED IN AFRICAN PARTY-BASED DEMOCRACIES? 
The dialectical ‘other’ of what is globalized is what is not globalized about African party-
based democracy. This section deals with three aspects of African party-based democracy 
that have not (been) globalized: the ethnic nature of political parties, the persistence of up-
scaled patron-client networks , and the absence of internal party democracy. Each is discussed 
in turn. 
The ethnic nature of African political parties 
Generally, African political parties remain ethnic in nature, created, organised and dominated 
by an educated elite, and as modern political institutions, the elite exploit them to contest 
elections and maintain control over the personnel and the policy of government. Ethnic 
political parties are instruments for actualizing political elite interests often mistaken for the 
interests of their ethnic group or region. Two characteristics  are common to the majority of 
African party-based democ racies, as far as the political parties are concerned:  
 
First, African political parties tend to be elitist, based on non-democratic structures and 
organisation, with irregular contacts with their electoral base. Contacts among party 
committee members are superficial due to the leadership’s control over party management. 
The educational gap between party leadership and functionaries also inflicts limitations on 
the party members to voice concerns or to take their concerns seriously when they voiced. 
Political contacts with the electorates are periodic with the highest level of intensity during 
election campaigns. 
 
 21 
Second, the majority of party members are politically illiterate (i.e. not aware of the 
ideological bases on which modern political parties are founded as liberal, social democratic 
or republican) and lack experience of how democratic institutions operate. In the 
circumstances, ethnicity provides a strong ideological foundation based on an ethnic system 
of belief, political values and culture. 
 
If political parties are institutional mechanisms for capturing and maintaining power, then 
elections are the institutional mechanism through which political parties compete for power. 
Elections are rightful political activities in which citizens exercise their sovereign will in 
selecting their representatives, who eventually form or select the personnel and policy of 
government. Furthermore, elections facilitate the orderly transfer of power according to the 
will of a sovereign citizenry. Political parties that are ethnic inclined or ethnic in orientation, 
currently assume party-based democracy functions, with varying degrees of success.  
 
Although this has been well documented elsewhere, I observed that the influence of ethnicity 
in the political parties of the three countries under consideration has actually become more 
apparent with the onset of democratic rule , as ethnic groups sought to protect their interests 
through specific political parties in the region which they consider capable of giving them 
protection and security. 41 Table 5 shows the strong association of political parties with region 
and ethnicity in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi: 
 
Table 4: Ethnic Character and voting behaviour of major  political parties in Ghana, Kenya and 
Malawi 
Country Major political party, coalition 
or elite pacts 
Ethnic or regional support  
New Patriotic Party (NPP) Largely Ashanti, AQkuapem and Fante, also 
won votes in some NDC stronghold in the North.  
Ghana 
National Democratic Congress 
NDC) 
Akan/Ewe, Ga-Adangbe also gained support 
from a variety of smaller ethnic groups. 
Kenya National Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) 
Substantial support from the Lou ethnic group. 
Lou educated political elite form the majority of 
ministers in NARC Government, including 
President Kibaki. 
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Kenya African National Union 
KANU) 
Alliance of small ethnic groups with substantial 
Kikuyu support for Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo 
Kenyatta (the first President of independent 
Kenya) a failed Presidential candidate in 2002 
elections. 
 
Forum for the Restoration of 
Democracy-People (FORD-P) 
The only strong remaining fraction of FORD 
1992 which was created by Oginga Odinga (Lou 
and various ethnic groups from Nyasa, Central, 
Western and Rift Valley Provinces) 
United Democratic Front (UDF) Southern region (Yao), with MCP encroachment 
in some constituencies  (Chewa). 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) Central and adjacent Northern region: mainly, 
Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuko, Yao, Lomwe, Sena, 
Tonga, Ngoni, Ngonde 
Republican Party (RP) Dominant in Northern and Southern Region 
(Yao and mainly Tumbuko ethnic groups), 
gained votes from some ethnic groups in the 
North loyal to MCP and AFORD. Also 
encroached in UDF constituencies in the South.  
Malawi 
Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) Northern region: Tumbuko, Tonga and 
Chakufwa ethnic groups, strong rivalry with 
MCP. 
Sources: The author compiled this table from various sources, in particular matching 
Constituency/District 2004 Election results and dominant ethnic groups . 
 
For example, in Kenya, although the major trend suggests voting on ethnic lines, there are a 
few exceptions often influenced by the extent of linguistic and cultural similarities of the 
dominant ethnic groups. The same applies to Malawi’s Northern, Central and Northern 
regions. UDF dominated in the South region and was able to encroach into MCP territory in 
the Central region. AFORD also shared Northern region votes with UDF. However, although 
the whole population identifies itself as northerners (or wakumpoto) in reality they belong to 
diverse ethnic groups, mainly Chakufwa, Chewa, Nyanja, Tumbuko, Yao, Lomwe, Sena, 
Tonga, Ngoni, Ngonde42. This case is not different from that of Ghana where NDC enjoys 
large support from Akan/Ewe and Ga-Adangbe support, but also gained support from a variety of 
smaller ethnic groups, while NPP was unassailable  among the Ashante, Fante and Akuapem43  
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Interestingly, all presidential candidates during the last presidential elections in Ghana, 
Kenya and Malawi gained the majority of the votes in their ethnic group constituencies. The 
implications of this for the formation of government, distribution of ministerial positions and 
chairpersons of parliamentary committees are horrendous. This has contributed to a 
venomous critique of the governments of the respective presidents , highlighting charges of 
nepotism and corruption. 
 
Despite the fact that it is a crude generalization to claim that all members of the same ethnic 
mentioned in the table vote only for one political party only, the table reveals that, despite 
their adherence to party-based democracy ethos as quasi-polyarchy, there is a clear affiliation 
of the dominant political allegiance to region and ethnicity. Because ethnic groups assume 
some permanence, the elites holding of power through their manipulation also assumes a 
sense of continuity of the political values enshrined in inter- and intra-ethnic politics. For the 
African electorates’ ethnic groups, and not modern Western ideology, became the ideological 
markers for a leadership devoid of the concept of the circulation of the elite  – something that 
is central to the idea of party-based democracy. This phenomenon has also negatively 
entrenched patronage and contributed to the poor record of internal democracy in Africa’s 
political parties. 
Patron client re lationship 
An important feature where party-based democracy has not globalized is the strong presence 
of client-patron relations between party leadership and party operative. Political party tycoons 
and the oligarchies personal kick backs, or central government support to access local 
political gains or thwart (at times provoke) conflicts (such as the case of Kenya’s Rift Valley 
Clashes between 1997 – 1999. In this sense, a client -patron relationship is fundamentally a 
relationship of exchange where the client in turn provides support for the patron. 44  
 
As if the troublesome presence of ethnic divisions is not sufficient complication for African 
democratization politics, Berman (1998) traced the linkages between ethnicity and patron-
client networks  to the colonial rule grounded in the latter alliance with local chiefs. 
According to Breman (Ibid. 305) “patron-client networks remain the fundamental state-
society linkage in circumstances of social crisis and uncertainty and have extended to the very 
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centre of the state. This accounts for all personalistic, materialistic and opportunistic character 
of African politics”.45  
 
Evidently, the politics of patronage does not remain at the state -society level and nor is it 
static. For example, Tangri (1999) shows that politics of patronage seeps also through the 
state-private sector relations as a facilitator of the access to resources and economic 
opportunities, even when the state responds to global policy designs such as privatisation.46 
The interplay of public and private enterprises and the shift of resources from the public to 
the private sector has also benefited from entrenched patronage relations, corruption and 
malpractices in favour of political allies and literally brethren, or in response to social 
pressures from modern business or political elite and ethnic patronage networks. 
 
Globalisation has on the one hand, created transformed local leaders/chiefs and subjects’ 
patronage relations in the sense that chiefs are increasingly impoverished materially and in 
terms of power, and therefore unable to respond to the demands of modern politics. They 
increasing play an intermediary role between the elite and the voters rather than commanding 
the main power resources. This intermediary role means that the chiefs and the local leaders 
use their proximity to society and deliver votes to the ethnic group presidential or 
parliamentary candidate  in exchange for financial and other types of support.  
 
Because patronage benefits the chiefs and just a few individuals within the ethnic groups, it is 
understandable that those left out consider it as a non-African.  
 
To be sure, in the case of Kenya, which could be generalized for other parts of rural Africa, 
Kipkorir, laments; 
 
Our country is built on the pillar of all the tribes, creating a beneficial symphony of 
cultural and linguistic diversity. However, our leaders have hijacked our tribal diversity 
for their own selfish ends. Every time leaders ‘steal’ from the country, they eat with 
their nuclear family, but when experience a fall-out, they make refuge in their tribes. 
What I have never understood is why Kenyans always rally around their own at that 
time, why we have never realised that tribes never steal or grab property. This is what 
makes us unique”. 47 
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In a sense, this quotation is about the individualism brought about by the 
commoditization of the so-called econom y of compassion and the prevalence of neo-
liberal values in a globalized African polity.  
 
A final commentary on this sub-section is that globalized party-based democracy has 
also brought along globalized forms of patronage , whereby political parties expect 
favours from transnational corporations during election campaigns.48 In fact, the 
governing political parties also found themselves at the mercy of a semi-patronage 
relationship with the international financial institutions’ capa bility to reward political 
parties that adhere to the economic reform agenda , and withdraw such support from 
‘non-compliant’ governments –  and subsequently the political parties that form them. 
As described here in the cases of Kenya and Ghana, the war of will between opposition 
and government and their respective competences to implement major economic and 
social reform policies , is also part of this globally operated new patronage 
arrangements. 
 
In sum, globalized party-based democracy has moved traditional localized or state -
based patronage networks closer to global patronage networks involving global actors , 
who exert their influence on political parties throughout Africa and in other parts of the 
developing world too. As Peter Burnell and Jan Art Scholte have separately argued, 
adaptation and variant forms of continuity, rather than schism or rupture, have shaped 
political party oscillation between localization and globalisation.49 Both developments 
should in the process also influence our understanding of new and complex political 
party arrangements, which traverse local, national and regional boundaries and get 
involved in global parliamentary and party-to-party networks.  
Internal party democracy 
Ethnic, regional or religious cleavage and patronage affect internal party democracy, 
as political parties become fiefdoms of their political leaders.  Internal party 
democracy - defined in terms of how candidates are selected, the rules for leadership 
contests, regular membership conventions, and internal rules to discipline party 
leadership and hold it accountable to party members - is in short supply in all major 
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political parties in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi. Invariably, small core committee 
members decide party affairs and policy.  
 
With a few exceptions, most party leaders use their privileged position to enrich themselves 
at the expense of the masses in whose name they contest elections and win parliamentary 
seats.50 Mwakyembe (1994)  reminds us African political parties are not democratic; they 
exclude ordinary, mostly uneducated people from the political process, are elitist and non-
transparent.51 In some cases, non-elected wealthy and powerful party members collude with 
the state to control the party, thus creating an executive with muted legislative or political 
checks and balances. 
 
In all three cases, the leaders of the major political parties are products of and participated in 
a long period of one-party rule. They have defected, joined the democratic struggle or 
established their own political parties. Others were released from their ministerial duties by 
(or disagreed with) their former political mentors and joined the opposition. 52  
 
The financing of the political parties is dependent on the  personal wealth of the leader at best , 
or the public coffers at worst, which helped them to organise election campaigns and lead a 
lavish lifestyle. In such circumstances, the party leader becomes the party boss with 
unquestioned authority over party committees, policies and decisions. However, Bertha 
Chiroro (2005: p.2) reminds us that:  
 
In most parties an  internal party democracy remains a challenge amidst the legacy 
of centralisation, which emanated from the liberation struggle. However, two 
developments are taking place in the region: i) the increased realisation that 
political parties are at the core of democratic governance. This has prompted the 
focus on the capacity building of political parties, which includes their funding, 
and creating an enabling environment for their existence. ii) The increased 
involvement of civil society organisations in the functioning of parties has led to 
the opening up of parties in the region to be able to participate more with Women’s 
organisations labour unions, students, churches and other rural organisations to 
influence policies. 53   
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In this regard, the institutionalization of internal party democracy in African is contingent on 
the maturation and ability of civic associations to influence them. In this it is important to 
realize that patron-client relationships and internal party democracy cannot be divorced from 
the political environment in which democracy is practiced.  
 
At least three points could be teased out here. First, one way of looking at party-based 
democracy is that it acquires its meaning from global policy influences on the current wave of 
multi-party democracy and new global context within which political parties operate. In 
common with political parties elsewhere in the world, African political parties are aware of 
their position in the geopolitics of development, which characterises their political 
programmes and policy orientations.  
 
Second, political party vocabulary, policy and party-electorate relations straddle the contours 
of similar but nationally different globally informed neo-liberal paradigms, without stifling 
the possibility of the emergence of vocal anti-globalisation political parties and civil society 
activism. This trend is not different from other parts of the world, where the challenges to the 
neo-liberal paradigm come from the very democratic forces that it has unleashed.  
 
Third, globalized party-based democracy does not mean universalised party-based democracy 
-  a point which has been emphasized as ope ning up the political for political contestation 
(Burnell 2004).54 In other words, political parties’ worldwide could subscribe to a range of 
broadly defined global paradigms as reflected in their political manifestos, such as the ones  
consulted by this writer. Evidently, there would always be points both of convergence and 
divergence on some elements of any globally informed socio-economic or political paradigm. 
CONCLUSIONS 
African political parties exhibit some elements of globalized party-based democracy with 
features common to other examples of quasi-polyarchy around the world.  The political 
manifestos, programmes and policy orientations adhere to the ethos of globalized party-based 
democracy in the sense that they are informed and subsequently  influenced by their 
membership of a wide range of global networks and party-to-party networks .  
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However, African political parties also exhibit some elements of localised or national 
political culture, such as the absence of internal party democracy, persistent patronage 
arrangements and strong party affiliation with ethnicity, religion or region, which alerts us to 
the fact that African party-based democracy has generally retained the form and less so the 
content of Western party-based democracy.  
 
Should the distinction between form and content persuade us to argue that the qualities of 
party-based democracies that do not conform to the content of Western democracies are in 
question? Is (or should) the notion ‘globalised party-based democracy’ (be) predicated on the 
prevalence of the dominant Western “liberal democratic” form, regardless of the actual 
quality of its democratic content? In responding to this question, I suggest that while the 
content of African party-based democracy leaves much to be desired, the political elite has 
used the form effectively to become members of and receive support from global party-based 
democracy networks. In this respect, African democracies are globalized party-based 
democracies because they are full members of these global democracy networks, which 
generally operate within the parameters of quasi-polyarchy. 
 
Regardless of their ambivalence toward internal political party democracy and the knowledge 
that they exhibit quasi-polyarchy characteristics, African political parties have been 
successful in canvassing vast human, and external and internal financial resources. They are 
also able to maintain themselves as political organisations with a set of broadly defined 
values, mobilise popular support, win and lose elections as well as form and, in a few cases, 
initiate  motions of no confidence in government. Measured by these formative political party 
characteristics, African parties satisfy the requirements of globalized party-based democracies  
- because they generally assume universal political party functions , or have accommodated to 
quasi-polyarchy. However, the failure of African party-based democracies to turn into full 
polyarchies finds recourse in the contention of Dahl and others that it would probably take 
several generations before such an elusive ambition could be realised. 
 
Therefore, it is evident that global party-based democracy networks have carved three distinct 
strategies in dealing with international democracy promotion, which is relatively different 
from fraternal foundations and other multilateral organizations. First, global parliamentary 
networks promote globalized parliamentary-based democracy by developing the capacity of 
parliamentarians regardless of their ideological orientation. Second, global party-to-party 
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networks promote globalized party-based democracy in a bid to bring Africa and other 
developing countries into conformity with the ethos and core values of “western” party-based 
democracy. Third, bilateral and multi-lateral institutions pursue global democracy including 
in Africa, with an aim of strengthening democratic institutions, including of course for 
parliaments, political parties and the rule of law, constitutional reforms, good governance, 
and state building among others.  
 
Finally, then, it is difficult to argue that Africa could develop a unique party-based democracy 
responding to its own political culture and position in the new context of development so long 
as it operates under the influence of such powerful global parliamentary and party-to-party 
democracy networks. However, African party-based democracy, as has been demonstrated in 
this paper, have so far retained some institutional arrangements informed by African levels of 
socio-economic development and the diverse political cultures, some of which impinge  
negatively on its overall democratic credence. 
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Coalition [NARC] government has led to the suspension by the European Union [EU] of aid to 
Kenya barely eight months after a group of donors resumed lending to the country. Ben Ephson 
reports “Of 133 countries included in the 2003 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index, Ghana ranked 70th with a score of 3.3 on a 10 point scale, the same score it received in 
1999. This represented a drop from a score of 3.9, which it received in 2002—an indication, some 
charged, that despite the government's declared war on corruption, not much has been achieved”.  
For more details see: http://www.public -i.org/ga/country.aspx?cc=gh&act=notebook. In Malawi, 
the story is not different. A Report written by Nixon Khembo for Transparency International (TI) 
released on May 17, 2005, laments, “"The study finds that corruption increased in Malawi as a 
result of weak institutions of state restraint. That is to say, parliamentary oversight was weak 
because of executive dominance, accounting systems were not efficient due to lack of resources, 
constitutional bodies depended largely on foreign donors for their functions, and political parties in 
Government depended on state resources for their survival and activities ". Transparency 
International, National Integrity System in Malawi Country Report 2005. (Ber lin: Transparency 
International, May 2005).  
37 Blakers, Margaret (ed.) The Global Greens: The story of the Global Green 2001 in Canberra.  2001. 
Canberra: Australian Greens and the Green Institute, 2001. See also the Global Greens Website: 
http://www.globalgreens.info 
38 Examples are Friend of the Earth and Green Peace campaigns against Shell Oil Company 
operations in the Nigerian Delta and the fate of the Ogoni people.  
39 Global party-to-party partnerships have developed strict criteria which restrict membership only to 
those political parties which fulfil all the requirements laid down in their constitutions.  
40 For more on modernization revisionism, refer to M. A. Mohamed Salih’s “Introduction” in M.A. 
African Democracies and African Politics (London: Pluto, 2001).  
 
42 For more on AFORD-United Democratic Front ethnicity and language policy and politics see Kamwendo, G. 
“Ethnic Revival and Language Associations in the New Malawi”, in Harri Englund (Ed.) A Democracy of 
Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi. (Uppsala: Nordic Institute of African Studies, 2001), 
pp. 140-150.  
43 For more on ethnicity and politics in these three countries, refer to Lenz, C. and Paul Nugent (eds.) 
Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Chirwa, C. W. “The 
Politics of Ethnicity and Regionalism in Contemporary Malawi”, in African Rural and Regional 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1994, pp. 93-118; Muigai, G. “Ethnicityand the Renewal of Competitive 
Politics in Kenya”, in. Harvey Glickman (ed.) Ethnic Conflicts and Democratization in Africa.  
(Atlanta Ga.: African Studies Association Press, 1995), 161-196; and Kalipeni, E, “ Regional 
Polarisation in Voting Pattern: Malawi 1994 Elections”, in African Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, 1997, pp. 152-167. 
44 See  Clapham pp. 58-59 who also argues in the same vein that, “This process (client-patron 
relations) leads to resource allocations often very different from those, which would be produced 
by 'universal criteria of efficiency, and need.” 
45 Berman, Bruce, J., “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil 
Nationalism”, in African Affairs, Vol. 97, 1998, pp. 305-341.  
46 Tangri, Roger. The Politics of Patronage in Africa: Parastatals, Privatization and Private 
Enterprise . (Oxford: James Currey, 1999). 
47 Donald Kipkorir. The East African Standard, 19 June 2005.  
48 Ghanaian, Kenyan and Malawian newspapers are awash with corruption scandals and claims and 
counter claims of the involvement of British Ashanti Gold, Lorno International and South African 
business interests in buying favours from the governing political parties, in these countries, 
respectively.  
49 Refer to Jan Art scholte, chapter 11 entitled “Globalization and (Un)democracy” of Jan Aart 
Scholte Globalization: A Critical Introduction. (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
forthcoming 2005, second edition). 
50 I refer particularly to the corruption scandals which gripped Ghana, Kenya and Malawi only a few 
months after the opposition political parties took the reign of power from the one-party states.  
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A. Beyene and G. Mutahaba (eds.) The Quest for Constitutionalism in East Africa. Bern: Peter 
Lang, 1994) 
52 President Kufuor of Ghana was Member and Parliament and Deputy foreign Minister in 1969, 
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of Malawi during multiparty democracy was Minister of Education (1976-1977) and Minister of 
Transport and Communication (1977-1981).  
53 Chiroro, Bertha. Political Parties and Democratic Governance- South Africa and Zimbabwe. (Paper 
presented at the UNISA Africa Day Conference, UNISA, Pretoria; 2 June 2005). 
54 Refer to Peter Burnell’s position paper entitled “Globalizing Party-based Democracy: Political 
Parties, Globalization, and International Democracy Assistance”, published in the Working paper 
Series of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, April 2005. Jan Art 
Scholte, chapter 11 entitled “Globalization and (Un)democracy” of Jan Aart Scholte Globalization: 
A Critical Introduction. (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2005 second 
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